My paper “Approximate mechanism design without money,” co-authored with Moshe Tennenholtz, is co-winner of the 2020 IFAAMAS Influential Paper Award. The citation reads:
This paper was the first to formally initiate the field of approximate mechanism design without money, as the title accurately suggests. It blends a key contribution from economics (mechanism design without money) and a key contribution from computer science (approximation algorithms), thus bonding the two disciplines further. Its publication has led to an explosion of papers on mechanism design without money. The concept has been applied to a vast number of fundamental problems such as facility location, resource allocation/cake-cutting, scheduling, assignment problem, matching/kidney exchange, voting, classification, auctions without money, and automated mechanism design. The extended version of the paper, appearing in the ACM Transactions of Economics and Computation in 2013, received the distinction of the ACM Computing Reviews “Best of 2013”.