

# Economics and Computation (Spring 2026)

## Assignment #5

Due: 4/28/2026 11:59pm ET

### Problem 1: Random assignment

[20 points] A random assignment  $P$  is *envy free* if for all  $i, j \in N$  and  $x \in G$ ,

$$\sum_{y \succeq_{\sigma_i} x} p_{iy} \geq \sum_{y \succeq_{\sigma_i} x} p_{jy}.$$

Prove that the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism produces an envy-free random assignment.

### Problem 2: Cascade models

[15 points] In Lecture 17 we discussed the coordination game. Consider a similar game, called the *local public goods game*, which is defined using the notation used in Slide 3. The possible actions are again  $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$ , but here 1 corresponds to investing in a good that is useful to the neighbors of  $i$ , and 0 corresponds to not investing. The utility of  $i$  is

$$u_i(\mathbf{a}) = \begin{cases} 1 - c & a_i = 1 \\ 1 & a_i = 0 \text{ and } n_{i,1}(\mathbf{a}_{-i}) \geq 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

That is,  $i$  gets a payoff of 1 if at least one player in their neighborhood (including themselves) invests, but investment has a cost of  $c \in (0, 1)$ .

Design a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a pure Nash equilibrium in a given local public goods game.

### Problem 3: Influence maximization

[20 pts] Given an undirected graph  $G = (V, E)$ , define the following set function over subsets  $S \subseteq V$ :

$$f(S) = |\{(u, v) \in E : u \in S, v \notin S\}|.$$

Is  $f$  monotone? Is it submodular? Prove or disprove each property.

#### Problem 4: No-regret learning

[20 pts] Consider the analysis of (deterministic) weighted majority in Lecture 19, Slides 11–14. Assume that there is a perfect expert that never makes mistakes. Show that there is a value of  $\epsilon$  such that the modified weighted majority algorithm (Slide 14) makes at most  $\log_2 n$  mistakes, where  $n$  is the number of experts.

#### Problem 5: Feature attribution

[25 points] The Shapley value is hard to compute, but it is easy to estimate accurately using a Monte Carlo algorithm. Specifically, given a player  $i$  whose Shapley value we wish to estimate, consider the following algorithm: For  $t = 1, \dots, m$ , sample a random permutation  $\pi_t$  and compute  $v(S_{\pi_t}^i \cup \{i\}) - v(S_{\pi_t}^i)$ ; then return the marginal contribution of  $i$  averaged across the  $m$  samples.

Assume that  $v(S) \in [0, 1]$  for all  $S \subseteq N$  and  $v$  is monotonic. Show that, given  $\epsilon, \delta > 0$  and  $m = O(\ln(1/\delta)/\epsilon^2)$ , the above algorithm outputs an estimate  $\hat{\sigma}_i$  of the Shapley value of  $i$  such that  $|\sigma_i - \hat{\sigma}_i| < \epsilon$  with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

**Guidance:** Each sample is a random variable; what can you say about their expectations? Plug these random variables into Hoeffding's Inequality: Let  $X_1, \dots, X_m$  be i.i.d. random variables bounded in  $[0, 1]$  with  $\mathbb{E}[X_j] = \mu$  for  $j = 1, \dots, m$ , then

$$\Pr \left[ \left| \frac{1}{m} \sum_{t=1}^m X_t - \mu \right| \geq \epsilon \right] \leq 2 \cdot e^{-2m\epsilon^2}.$$