


Optimized Democracy

Fall 2025
Fair Redistricting
Ariel Procaccia | Harvard University

THE CONSTITUTION




Sellion. 3. The Inale of the United States shall be composed of two Sendon from each State, chasen by the Ligislature thereof forme years; and each Immediately after they shall be varied as the Constitution of the Senators of the first black of the senator of Senator shall have one Vole. Reces of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof marginake temperary appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall their fill No Person shall be at lender who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty years, and been nine years a betigen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be and Inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen. The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall chose their other Offices, and also a President pre tempore, in the Unence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of The Senate shall have the sole Power to by all Impeachments. When sitting for that Surpase, they shall be on Cath or Afirmation? When the President President of the United States. of the United States the Chief Justice shall preside. And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Gases of Empeachment shall not extend further than to uneval from Ofice, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Ofice of honor, First or Profit under the United States but the Party consided shall nevertheles be liable and subject to Indiament, Thial, Judgment and Plinishmont, Vaction 1. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Chetions for Senators and Representatives, shall be presented in each State by the Legislature thereof but the Congress may at any time by Law make a atter wich Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.


The Congress shall assemble at least once in course your, and a time to get all he on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Low Section 5: Cach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualipeations of its own Mombers, and Majority of cach shall constitute a The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and well as a cach secure may provide. Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof..." Cach House shall keep a fournal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their fudgment aguire Secrety; and the Yeas and house of the Members of ather House on any question shall at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, been level on the Journal Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall wishout the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place

Than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. Sellien 6. The Senator and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Trasury of the Prace, be privileged from Unist during their attendance at the Seption of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the some; and for any speak or Debate in either House, they halt not be questioned in No Senator or Representative shall during the Time for which he was deded be appointed to any civil office under the Authority of the United States which shall have been encreased during such times and no Poron holding any Office under the United which shall have been encreased during such times and no Poron holding any Office under the United Males, hall be a Member of other House during his Continuance in office. Hellon J. All Bills for raising Avenue shall argenate in the House of Aspers intellines; but the Sanda may propose or concurrenth Umenderents es on other Bo Every Bill which shall have profeed the Merinary the surrections and the Verset whall before it become a Law, be presented to the Resident of the

REDISTRICTING



GERRYMANDERING



gerrymander • verb • to divide or arrange (a territorial unit) into election districts in a way that gives one political party an unfair advantage




The gerrymander


1812-present

"A new species of monster, which appeared in Essex South District in Jan. 1812."


AMERICA'S MOST GERRYMANDERED



North Carolina 12th District



Maryland 3rd District




Pennsylvania 7th District


Source: The Washington Post, 2014

I CUT, YOU FREEZE

Players take turns freezing a district drawn by the other player, and redrawing the unfrozen districts, until all districts are frozen



I CUT, YOU FREEZE




The Washington Post

Opinion | There's another way to solve gerrymandering. It's as simple as cake.

By Wesley Pegden and Ariel D. Procaccia

February 15, 2018 at 8:10 p.m. EST



I CUT, YOU FREEZE: ANALYSIS

- A non-geometric model:
 - Each of the two players has V_i units of voters such that $V_1 + V_2 = k$
 - A partition consists of k pairs (v_{1d}, v_{2d}) such that $\sum_{d=1}^{k} v_{id} = V_i$ for i = 1,2, and for all districts d, v_{1d} + $v_{2d} = 1$
 - Player i wins district d if $v_{id} > v_{3-i,d}$

Poll


Suppose that $V_1 = \alpha k$ for $\alpha \le 1/2$ and that player 1 redistricts unilaterally. What fraction of the districts can they guarantee to win (roughly)?


- $\alpha/2$ α 2α 1/2



I CUT, YOU FREEZE: ANALYSIS


Theorem: Let $V_i = \alpha k$. As $k \to \infty$, under the ICYF protocol and optimal play, the fraction of districts won by player i is $2\alpha^2$ for $\alpha \le 1/2$ and $1 - 2(1 - \alpha)^2$ for $\alpha > 1/2$





PROPORTIONALITY


- A proportional partition is such that if $V_i = \alpha k$, i wins an α fraction of the districts
- But when geometric constraints are taken into account, this is not a feasible standard



MA gubernatorial election, 2022 (Healey vs. Diehl)


GEOMETRIC TARGET

- Consider a set \mathcal{D} of possible partitions (possibly obeying geometric constraints)
- The geometric target of player i is the average of the maximum number of districts they can win (across partitions in \mathcal{D}) and the minimum number, rounded down



GEOMETRIC TARGET

Theorem: In the geometry-free model, a partition is proportional if and only if it satisfies the geometric target of both parties (up to ties)




THE LRY PROTOCOL


A protocol proposed by Landau, Reid and Yershov (2009):

- 1. For $j=1,\ldots,k-1$, a mediator constructs a split (X_j,Y_j) such that $X_1\subset X_2\subset \cdots X_{k-1}$
- 2. For each j, each player is asked "would you rather redistrict X_j , with the other player redistricting Y_j , or vice versa?
- 3. Try to find a j such that one player prefers redistricting X_j and the other Y_j
- 4. If no such j exists, there must be j_0 such that both players want to redistrict Y_{j_0} and X_{j_0+1} . Choose $s \in \{j_0, j_0 + 1\}$ at random and let a random player redistrict X_s and the other player redistrict Y_s

THE LRY PROTOCOL: EXAMPLE




Both players prefer redistricting Y_1 , Y_2 , X_3 , X_4 , so the crossover point is $j_0 = 2$



THE LRY PROTOCOL: ANALYSIS

• Theorem: Restricting the set of partitions \mathcal{D} to satisfy a given split, a party's preferred choice satisfies their geometric target



THE LRY PROTOCOL: ANALYSIS

- Theorem: Restricting the set of partitions \mathcal{D} to satisfy a given split, a party's preferred choice satisfies their geometric target
- Even if a party doesn't get its preferred choice in (X_{j_0}, Y_{j_0}) , their preference in the very similar split (X_{j_0+1}, Y_{j_0+1}) is reversed, so overall we get an "approximation" of the geometric target


OPTIMIZATION SUBJECT TO FAIRNESS

- Instead of an interactive protocol, optimize an objective function subject to a fairness constraint, namely geometric target
- Possible objectives:
 - Compactness
 - Number of competitive districts
 - Efficiency gap
- Two obstacles:
 - How to solve the optimization problem?
 - Is the geometric target feasible in practice?

THE STATE CUTTING PROBLEM


- The state *S* is the interval [0,1]
- A district *D* is a finite union of subintervals
- Each player $i \in \{1,2\}$ has a density function f_i^J such that for all x, $f_i^1(x) + f_i^2(x) = 1$
- Let $u_i^j(D) = \int_D f_i^j(x) dx$
- We consider a partition into k districts, where for each, $\mu(D)=1/k$
- A player i believes they won a district D if $u_i^i(D) > u_i^{3-i}(D)$
- Compared to the non-geometric model, this captures a key real-world constraint: voters can't be partitioned arbitrarily

THE STATE CUTTING PROBLEM



EXISTENCE OF GT PARTITIONS

Theorem: In any instance of the state cutting problem, a partition satisfying the geometric targets of both players with respect to their own beliefs exists



GT partitions in Virginia (left) and North Carolina (right) which outperform their implemented plans in terms of competitiveness, efficiency gap and compactness

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- G. Bendadè, A. D. Procaccia and J. Tucker-Foltz. You Can Have Your State and Redistrict It Too. Manuscript, 2022.