# ECONOMICS & COMPUTATION

Spring 2025 | Lecture 6
The Epistemic Approach to Voting
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CONDORCET STRIKES AGAIN

- For Condorcet, the purpose of voting is not merely to balance subjective opinions; it is a collective quest for the truth

- Enlightened voters try to judge which alternative best serves society

- This is an arguable model of political elections, but there are certainly settings where the ground-truth assumption holds true

CONDORCET JURY THEOREM

Theorem [Condorcet 1785]: Suppose that there is a correct alternative and an incorrect alternative, and there are n voters, each of whom votes independently for the correct alternative with probability $p > 1/2$, then the probability that the majority would be correct goes to 1 as $n \to \infty$

CONDORCET JURY THEOREM

- The (modern) proof follows directly from the (weak) law of large numbers
- **Lemma:** Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ be an infinite sequence of i.i.d. random variables with expectation μ, then for any $\epsilon > 0$,
  $$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr\left[|\bar{X}_n - \mu| < \epsilon\right] = 1$$
- Now take $\epsilon = p - 1/2$

# THE CASE OF $m \geq 3$

- In Condorcet's general model there is a true ranking of the alternatives

- Each voter evaluates every pair of alternatives independently, gets the comparison right with probability $p > 1/2$

- The results are tallied in a voting matrix

- Condorcet's proposal: Find the "most probable" ranking by taking the majority opinion for each comparison; if a cycle forms, "successively delete the comparisons that have the least plurality"

CONDORCET'S "SOLUTION"

	a	b	c
a	-	8	6
b	5	-	11
c	7	2	-

Delete $c \succ a$ to get $a \succ b \succ c$

CONDORCET'S "SOLUTION"

	a	b	c	d
a	-	12	15	17
b	13	-	16	11
c	10	9	-	18
d	8	14	7	-

Order of strength is $c \succ d$, $a \succ d$, $b \succ c$, $a \succ c$, $d \succ b$, $b \succ a$; deleting $b \succ a$ leaves a cycle; deleting $d \succ b$ creates ambiguity

CONDORCET'S "SOLUTION"

	a	b	c	d
a	-	12	15	17
b	13	-	16	11
c	10	9	-	18
d	8	14	7	-

Did Condorcet mean we should reverse the weakest comparisons? If we reverse $b \succ a$ and $d \succ b$, we get $a \succ b \succ c \succ d$, with 89 votes, but reversing $d \succ b$ leads to $b \succ a \succ c \succ d$ with 90 votes

Isaac Todhunter

1820–1884

"The obscurity and self-contradiction are without any parallel, so far as our experience of mathematical works extends … no amount of examples can convey an adequate impression of the evils."

YOUNG'S SOLUTION

- M is the matrix of votes and π is the true ranking

- MLE maximizes $\Pr[M \mid \pi]$

- Suppose true ranking is $a \succ_\pi b \succ_\pi c$; prob. of observations $\Pr[M \mid \pi]$:

$$\binom{13}{8} p^8 (1-p)^5 \cdot \binom{13}{6} p^6 (1-p)^7 \cdot \binom{13}{11} p^{11} (1-p)^2$$

- For $a \succ_\pi c \succ_\pi b$, $\Pr[M \mid \pi]$ is

$$\binom{13}{8} p^8 (1-p)^5 \cdot \binom{13}{6} p^6 (1-p)^7 \cdot \binom{13}{2} p^2 (1-p)^{11}$$

- Binomial coefficients are identical, so

$$\Pr[M \mid \pi] \propto p^{\#agree} (1-p)^{\#disagree}$$

	a	b	c
a	-	8	6
b	5	-	11
c	7	2	-

THE KENDALL TAU DISTANCE

- The Kendall tau distance between σ and σ' is defined as

$$d_{KT}(\sigma, \sigma') = \left|\left\{\{a, b\}:\ a \succ_{\sigma} b \wedge b \succ_{\sigma'} a\right\}\right|$$

- Can be thought of as "bubble sort distance"

THE MALLOWS MODEL

- Defined by parameter $\phi \in (0,1]$

- Probability of a voter having the ranking σ given true ranking π is

$$\Pr[\sigma|\pi] = \frac{\phi^{d_{KT}(\sigma,\pi)}}{\sum_\tau \phi^{d_{KT}(\tau,\pi)}}$$

- Same as the Condorcet noise model where the process "restarts" if a cycle forms and

$$\phi = \frac{1-p}{p}$$

THE KEMENY RULE

- What is probability of observing profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ given true ranking π?

- Denote $Z_\phi = \sum_\tau \phi^{d_{KT}(\tau,\pi)}$, then

$$\Pr[\boldsymbol{\sigma} \mid \pi] = \prod_{i \in N} \frac{\phi^{d_{KT}(\sigma_i,\pi)}}{Z_\phi} = \frac{\phi^{\sum_{i \in N} d_{KT}(\sigma_i,\pi)}}{\left(Z_\phi\right)^n}$$

- The MLE is clearly the Kemeny Rule: Given a preference profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$, return a ranking π that minimizes $\sum_{i \in N} d_{KT}(\sigma_i,\pi)$

COMPLEXITY OF KEMENY

- **Theorem:** Computing the optimal Kemeny score is NP-complete

- The proof exploits a connection to the Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem: Given a directed graph $G = (V, E)$ and $L \in \mathbb{N}$, is there $F \subseteq E$ s.t. $|F| \leq L$ and $(V, E \setminus F)$ is acyclic?

PROOF IDEA

(a, b)		(b, c)		(c, a)		(c, d)		(d, b)	
a	d	b	d	c	d	c	b	d	c
b	c	c	a	a	b	d	a	b	a
c	a	a	b	b	c	a	c	a	d
d	b	d	c	d	a	b	d	c	b

For each edge create a pair of voters that agree on the corresponding ordered pair of alternatives and disagree on everything else; there's an acyclic subgraph that deletes k edges if and only if there is a ranking that (beyond the inevitable disagreements) disagrees with k pairs of voters

KEMENY IN PRACTICE

In practice Kemeny computation is typically formulated as an integer linear program: For every $a, b \in A$, $x_{(a,b)} = 1$ iff a is ranked above b, and

$$w_{(a,b)} = \left| \{ i \in N : a \succ_{\sigma_i} b \} \right|$$

minimize $\sum_{(a,b)} x_{(a,b)} w_{(b,a)}$

subject to:

for all distinct $a, b \in A$, $x_{(a,b)} + x_{(b,a)} = 1$

for all distinct $a, b, c \in A$, $x_{(a,b)} + x_{(b,c)} + x_{(c,a)} \leq 2$

for all distinct $a, b \in A$, $x_{(a,b)} \in \{0,1\}$

AN AXIOMATIC VIEWPOINT

The axiomatic viewpoint isn't necessarily at odds with the epistemic viewpoint; how does Kemeny fare when examined through an axiomatic lens?