



**CMU 15-896**

**SOCIAL NETWORKS 2:**

**INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION**

**TEACHER:**

**ARIEL PROCACCIA**

# MOTIVATION

- Firm is marketing a new product
- Collect data on the social network
- Choose set  $S$  of early adopters and market to them directly
- Customers in  $S$  generate a cascade of adoptions
- Question: How to choose  $S$ ?





# INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS

- Assume: finite graph, progressive process
- Fixing a cascade model, define **influence function**
- $f(S)$  = expected #active nodes at the end of the process starting with  $S$
- Maximize  $f(S)$  over sets  $S$  of size  $k$
- **Theorem [Kempe et al. 2003]:** Under the general cascade model, influence maximization is NP-hard to approximate to a factor of  $n^{1-\epsilon}$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$



# PROOF OF THEOREM

- SET COVER: subsets  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  of  $U = \{u_1, \dots, u_t\}$ ; cover of size  $k$ ?
- Bipartite graph:  $u_1, \dots, u_t$  on one side,  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  and  $x_1, \dots, x_T$  for  $T = t^c$  on the other
- $u_i$  becomes active if  $S_j \ni u_i$  is active
- $x_j$  becomes active if  $u_1, \dots, u_t$  are active
- Min set cover of size  $k \Rightarrow T + t + k$  active
- Min set cover of size  $> k \Rightarrow < t + k$  active ■



# SUBMODULARITY FOR APPROXIMATION

- Try to identify broad subclasses where good approx is possible
- $f$  is **submodular** if for  $X \subseteq Y, v \notin Y$ ,  
$$f(X \cup \{v\}) - f(X) \geq f(Y \cup \{v\}) - f(Y)$$
- $f$  is **monotone** if for  $X \subseteq Y, f(X) \leq f(Y)$
- Reduction gives  $f$  that is not submodular
- **Theorem [Nemhauser et al. 1978]:**  $f$  monotone and submodular,  $S^*$  optimal  $k$ -element subset,  $S$  obtained by greedily adding  $k$  elements that maximize marginal increase; then

$$f(S) \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) f(S^*)$$





# INDEPENDENT CASCADE MODEL

- Reminder of model:
  - For each  $(u, v) \in E$  there is a weight  $p_{uv}$
  - When a node  $u$  becomes activated it has one chance to activate each neighbor  $v$  with probability  $p_{uv}$
- **Theorem [Kempe et al. 2003]:** Under the independent cascade model:
  - Influence maximization is NP-hard
  - The influence function  $f$  is submodular



# PROOF OF NP-HARDNESS

- Almost the same proof as before
- SET COVER: subsets  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  of  $U = \{u_1, \dots, u_t\}$ ; cover of size  $k$ ?
- Bipartite graph:  $u_1, \dots, u_t$  on one side,  $S_1, \dots, S_m$  on the other
- If  $u_i \in S_j$  then there is an edge  $(S_j, u_i)$  with weight 1
- Min SC of size  $k \Rightarrow t + k$
- Min SC of size  $> k \Rightarrow < t + k$  active ■



# PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY

- **Lemma:** If  $f_1, \dots, f_r$  are submodular functions,  $c_1, \dots, c_r \geq 0$ , then  $f = \sum_{i=1}^r c_i f_i$  is a submodular function
- **Proof:** Let  $X \subseteq Y$  and  $v \notin Y$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} & f(X \cup \{v\}) - f(X) - (f(Y \cup \{v\}) - f(Y)) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^r c_i [f_i(X \cup \{v\}) - f_i(X) - (f_i(Y \cup \{v\}) - f_i(Y))] \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$







# PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY

- Key idea: for each  $(u, v)$  we flip a coin of bias  $p_{uv}$  **in advance**
- Let  $\alpha$  denote a particular one of the  $2^{|E|}$  possible coin flip combinations
- $f_\alpha(S) =$  activated nodes with  $S$  as seed nodes and  $\alpha$  coin flips
- $v \in f_\alpha(S)$  iff  $v$  is reachable from  $S$  via **live** edges

# PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY

- $f_\alpha$  is submodular
- $f(S) = \sum_\alpha \Pr[\alpha] \cdot f_\alpha(S)$ ,  
that is,  $f$  is a nonnegative  
weighted sum of  
submodular functions
- By the lemma,  $f$  is  
submodular ■



# LINEAR THRESHOLD MODEL


- Reminder of model:
  - Nonnegative weight  $w_{uv}$  for each edge  $(u, v) \in E$ ;  $w_{uv} = 0$  otherwise
  - Assume  $\forall v \in V, \sum_u w_{uv} \leq 1$
  - Each  $v \in V$  has threshold  $\theta_v$  **chosen uniformly at random in  $[0,1]$**
  - $v$  becomes active if

$$\sum_{\text{active } u} w_{uv} \geq \theta_v$$

# LINEAR THRESHOLD MODEL

Poll 1: What is  $f(S)$ ?


1.  $\frac{2}{3}$
2.  $\frac{5}{2}$
3.  $\frac{8}{3}$
4.  $\frac{13}{4}$



# LINEAR THRESHOLD MODEL



**Poll 2:** Given that  $u$  is inactive, prob. it becomes active after  $v$  becomes active

1.  $1/6$
2.  $1/3$
3.  $1/2$
4.  $2/3$



# LINEAR THRESHOLD MODEL

- Theorem [Kempe et al. 2003]:  
Under the linear threshold model:
  - Influence maximization is NP-hard
  - The influence function  $f$  is submodular
- Difficulty: fixing the coin flips  $\alpha$ ,  $f_\alpha$  is not submodular



# PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY

- Each  $v$  chooses at most one of its incoming edges at random;  $(u, v)$  selected with prob.  $w_{uv}$ , and none with prob.  $1 - \sum_u w_{uv}$
- If we can show that these choices of live edges induce the same influence function as the linear threshold model, then the theorem follows from the same arguments as before



# PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY

- We sketch the equivalence of the two models
- Linear threshold:
  - $A_t$  = active nodes at end of iteration  $t$
  - $\Pr[v \in A_{t+1} \mid v \notin A_t] = \frac{\sum_{u \in A_t \setminus A_{t-1}} w_{uv}}{1 - \sum_{u \in A_{t-1}} w_{uv}}$
- Live edges:
  - At every times step, determine whether  $v$ 's live edge comes from current active set
  - If not, the source of the live edge remains unknown, subject to being outside the active set
  - Same probability as before ■



# PROGRESSIVE VS. NONPROGRESSIVE

- Nonprogressive threshold model is identical except that at each round  $v$  chooses  $\theta_v^t$  u.a.r. in  $[0,1]$
- Suppose process runs for  $T$  steps
- At each step  $t \leq T$ , can target  $v$  for activation;  $k$  interventions overall
- Goal:  $\sum_v \# \text{rounds } v \text{ was active}$
- Reduces to progressive case

