

# 15-251: Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science

## Recitation 4 Solutions

### $\mathcal{O}$ , I Think I Understand Asymptotics Now

Let  $f, g, h$  be functions from  $\mathbb{N}$  to  $\mathbb{N}$ . Prove or disprove the following:

(a) If  $f \in \mathcal{O}(g)$  and  $g \in \mathcal{O}(h)$ , then  $f \in \mathcal{O}(h)$

We know by definition that there exist  $n_1$  and  $c_1$  such that for all  $n \geq n_1$ ,  $f(n) \leq c_1g(n)$ . Similarly, we have  $n_2$  and  $c_2$  for  $g$  and  $h$ . Choose  $n_0 = \max(n_1, n_2)$  and  $c = c_1c_2$  and let  $n \geq n_0$ . Then,  $f(n) \leq c_1g(n) \leq c_1c_2h(n) = ch(n)$ , as desired, so  $f \in \mathcal{O}(h)$

(b) If  $f \in \mathcal{O}(g)$ , then  $g \in \mathcal{O}(f)$

Let  $f(n) = 1$  and  $g(n) = n$ . While  $f \in \mathcal{O}(g)$ , there is no  $n_0, c$  you can pick that makes  $n \leq c$  for all  $n \geq n_0$ , as we just let  $n > \max(c, n_0)$  as a counterexample. This seems like a silly and obvious example, but remember to be rigorous when disproving big- $\mathcal{O}$  membership: generally you'll have to find a counterexample in terms of arbitrary proposed  $c, n_0$ .

(c) For all  $k \in \mathbb{R}^+$ ,  $\log(n) \in \mathcal{O}(n^k)$ .

We choose  $n_0 = 1$  and  $c = \frac{1}{k}$ , and let  $n \geq n_0$  arbitrary. Note that  $\log(n^k) \leq n^k$ , as this inequality is true for all positive values  $n^k$ . By properties of logarithms,  $k \log(n) = \log(n^k)$ . Rearranging our inequalities, we then have that  $\log(n) \leq \frac{n^k}{k} = cn^k$ , as desired, concluding the proof.

### Odd-Paz

State and prove a divide-and-conquer procedure for proportional cake cutting between any number of players. (The Even-Paz algorithm as described in lecture is an excellent starting point.)

If  $n = 1$ : the single player takes the whole cake.

If  $n = 2k$  for some  $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ : every player draws a vertical line on the cake that cuts it in half according to their valuation function. Cut the cake anywhere between the  $k$ th and  $(k + 1)$ th lines inclusive. The players who drew the  $k$  leftmost lines recurse on the left piece and the players who drew the  $k$  rightmost lines recurse on the right piece.

If  $n = 2k + 1$  for some  $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ : every player draws a vertical line such that, according to their valuation function, the left side of the line is worth  $\frac{k}{2k+1}$  of the total cake and the right side of the line is worth  $\frac{k+1}{2k+1}$  of the total cake. Cut the cake on the median line. The players who drew the  $k$  leftmost lines recurse on the left piece and the players who drew the  $k + 1$  rightmost lines recurse on the right piece.

Claim: This algorithm is proportional: for any piece  $C$  of cake and for any number  $n$  of players, each player will walk away with a slice  $S_i$  that they feel is worth at least  $\frac{1}{n}$  of the value of  $C$ .

(Equivalently,  $\forall i. n \cdot V_i(S_i) \geq V_i(C)$ ). The proof is by induction.

*Base case* ( $n = 1$ ): duh. The player walks away with all of the remaining cake.  $1 \cdot V_i(C) \geq V_i(C)$ .

*Induction hypothesis*: for some  $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ , this algorithm always achieves a proportional allocation among  $(k - 1)$  players.

*Induction step* ( $n = 2k$ ): Note that after the cake is cut, the  $k$  players who recurse on the left piece (call it  $L$ ) value it at least half as much as they value  $C$ . By the IH, each player  $i$  will end up with a piece that they think is worth at least  $\frac{V_i(L)}{k}$ . But since we just showed that  $V_i(L) \geq \frac{V_i(C)}{2}$  for these players, this value is at least  $\frac{V_i(C)}{n}$ . So proportionality is achieved for these  $k$  players. An identical argument applies to the other  $k$  players, who recurse on the right piece.

*Induction step* ( $n = 2k + 1$ ): Note that after the cake is cut, the  $k$  players who recurse on the left piece (call it  $L$ ) value it at least  $\frac{k}{2k+1}$  as much as they value  $C$ . By the IH, each player  $i$  will end up with a piece that they think is worth at least  $\frac{V_i(L)}{k} \geq \frac{V_i(C)}{2k+1} = \frac{V_i(C)}{n}$ . A structurally identical argument applies to the  $k + 1$  players who recurse on the right piece: by the IH, they each end up with a piece that they think is worth at least  $\frac{V_i(R)}{k+1} \geq \frac{V_i(C)}{2k+1} = \frac{V_i(C)}{n}$ . So proportionality is achieved for everybody.